THE New Republic

Budget Message—
Long on Faith,
Short on Works

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By FRANK GETLEIN

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JANUARY 26, 1959

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Washington Wire

Dangerous Thoughts

A SWARTHY little Armenian with a waiter's moustache and a sinister glance is taking back to Moscow with him some new ideas, ideas which perhaps he does not even know he possesses. Anastas Mikoyan, second-ranking Communist in Moscow, made a meteoric series of appearances here after peddling a virtuoso's verbal vodka all across the United States. Nobody could watch him for a minute without being impressed by his extraordinary intelligence. There wasn't much doubt what he came over for: he came to sell charm, and more particularly to test the temperature of the United States after creating the Moscow-made crisis over Berlin with its so-called six-month "ultimatum."

My impression of Mikoyan is that he is a remarkably bright man. I think it was wonderful to have him here and that it would be even better if Khrushchev could come, as he wants to. I listen to the short wave broadcasts from Moscow now and then and they are shocking, not because they are such good propaganda but because they are so bad. They betray a conception of the United States that is almost artless in its raw ignorance of the kind of arguments that would sway Americans. When your enemy is as ignorant of you as that, then it becomes dangerous.

I believe Mikoyan now harbors dangerous thoughts. If I were Khrushchev I would send him to Siberia at once. Mikoyan will appear before the big party Congress in Moscow, January 27, where he will help build up Khrushchev's prestige. His trip has been depicted at home as a "triumphal" passage through the United States and that will help the popularity of the government which sent him over. But Mikoyan is a very intelligent man. He cannot forget the genuine curiosity he inspired, the essential friendliness, the willingness to discuss issues (despite the disgraceful performance of Lawrence Spivack who turned an alleged TV interview on "Meet the Press" into an anti-Communist harangue by Spivack). He can hardly believe we are a nation of warmongers. Mikoyan has had a substantial impact on the United States. I suspect the United States has had a bigger impact on Mikoyan, who is a very clever man.

Forward, March

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON looked a group of visitors in the eye recently and told them that Eisenhower was preparing to make the battle of his career for fiscal responsibility and a balanced budget. Eisenhower was going to take every opportunity for publicity he could get and would utilize a new format, probably a series of 15-minute interviews on television.

Following this the amiable President came before the National Press Club and frittered away an hour of valuable television time without the bother of bringing a prepared text or of adding anything new on any subject. With an amusing inappropriateness he used the appearance to downgrade the institution of the weekly press conference; he has held only two since last November.

We assume Eisenhower will make the scheduled TV appearances: they are handy affairs, with planted questions, and nobody there to talk back. We don't always agree with the President on economics but it would be good to see evidence of dynamic leadership, even for a crusade with which we might not go along. We suspect, however, that they will be tepid affairs, like the State of the Union message, the Press Club chat and now the budget.

The budget, we might add, with its postulate that Treasury revenue will leap $9 billion in a single amazing boom year, and that Congress will boost postage rates and gas taxes to achieve the supposititious "$100 million balance" strikes us as a more than usually fantastic fiscal fairy tale.

We have the oppressive sense of a big liberal flood in the United States dammed back in Congress or allowed to lose itself in the Sahara of arid parliamentary institutionalism. The country voted liberal last November. Yet the liberals have lost the first round in Congress. The frustration of a people's will is dangerous in a democracy.

Here is able Rep. Thomas Ashley (D, Ohio), rejecting appointment as assistant Democratic whip in the House. He says simply that it would be accepting responsibility without sharing in policy-making. Speaker Sam Rayburn makes the policy, Ashley says, as everybody knows. The Texan runs the 283-member Democratic majority in the House as "a one man show."

The filibuster vote tells the story in the Senate. We can drop a tear over some of the new Senators, like those from Alaska, who were liberal in the election but not on the first vote. Yet one can see their predicament. Lyndon Johnson held the whip hand. The newcomers want favorable committee assignments. They want regional legislation. They hear the Congressional voice of the Democratic Party.

Two Voices

FOR THE Democrats have two voices, the Congressional voice and the National voice. The National voice declared itself against the Senate filibuster in the 1956 party platform, demanding procedure "so that majority rule prevails." And the National voice was heard in the December 7 statement from the Democratic Advisory Council—an organization to which Truman, Stevenson and similar figures belong, but not Rayburn or Johnson. The statement declared categorically on the filibuster issue that "the decision of the *majority* of the total membership shall close debate."

Yet when Sen. Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) and the rest proposed this majority cloture rule in consonance with the National voice, Democratic Senators voted 20-43 against.

The test of whether the Johnson "compromise" means anything will come very soon in new civil rights legislation. An effort will be made to restore the enforcement provision that was dropped from the original measure (Section 3). Almost certainly the filibuster threat will block this and some shadowy face-saver will be substituted.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *Religion and Science*

SIRS:

I SUPPOSE it is natural enough that Professor Amos Wilder, commenting on Christianity and the Campus, (*NR*, Dec. 15), should expound his professional bias that religion contributes something to human experience that is not attain-

(Continued on page 23)

The Budget

THE PRESIDENT scooped his own budget message by announcing ahead of time that he would offer a $77 billion balanced budget with protection of the dollar as a keynote. With details now available the statement remains unconvincing. Few believe that the $77 billion will stand. By the end of this session of Congress the figure will have been raised, and (Q.E.D.) the President and his party enabled to say during next summer's campaign "I've been robbed" (by the spenders, of course).

Similarly, few believe that the balance will stay level, even with federal expenditures limited to $77 billion. Mr. Eisenhower's fiscal optimism is predicated on some chancy allies—on Congressional willingness to raise postal rates for a second consecutive year; on weather bad enough to cut down agricultural yields from this year's bumper records. The President's proposed cutback from the present level of spending—estimated at $80.9 billion for the current fiscal year—would be $3.9 billion.

Since the gross national product is estimated to be running at an annual rate of $470 billion by the end of 1959—the middle of the upcoming fiscal year—and to have room for expansion to around $505 billion before full employment would be reached, the collection of $77 billion in taxes is clearly less than a crushing burden.

Of every Eisenhower budget dollar in fiscal year 1960, 59 cents will be paid out for major national security purposes. A quarter out of every dollar will be split three ways: a dime for the people and institutions who loan the government money, seven cents to veterans, eight cents to agriculture. Everything else the government does will come out of the remaining 16 cents.

Setting apart veterans as a special class of recipients is an old practice. As the message points out, "with veterans and their families constituting nearly half of our population the cost of these veterans benefits is high, and will continue to increase as our veterans advance in age." But because of their number the ex-servicemen are safe, and this despite the President's known private views (supported in principle by the languishing Bradley report) that in many instances preferential aid to veterans is economically and socially indefensible and can only be justified on the grounds of political expediency.

It's the farmers who'd better look out; they are a declining group in actual numbers and in proportion to the rest of the population. This year, one of the major levers which tilted the budget out of balance has been the cost of the farm price support and related programs which bounded from $987 million in fiscal 1958 to an estimated $3,118 million by the close of business this coming June. Hence Mr. Eisenhower's sentence: "This system of price supports is not suited to the technically more efficient agriculture

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that has been rapidly developing in this country." It looks as though the farmer has met his Gettysburg.

The writing down of estimates for farm expenditures is paralleled by a writing off of another item which increased the deficit this year—the temporary federal unemployment compensation payment program under which $412 million is estimated to have been spent before it expires April 1. The assumption that unemployment would drop as business activity rose has not so far proved correct: unemployment in January, 1958, was 5.8 percent of a labor force, and in December, 1958, it was 6.1 percent of a labor force that increased by some 1¾ million people.

Operation of the economy at a level which does not use this wasting manpower is a deficit operation, although the President does not appear to see it this way. Likewise, restriction of government spending for facilities which are not purchasable through private means but which are needed for the modern, technological economy to which the budget makes repeated reference, is a denial of national purpose.

Mr. Eisenhower is strong on purposes. His State of the Union proposal for a committee to define national goals, to which he returns in his budget message, unaccompanied by action to make these goals realizable, shows him for what he is, a goal-keeper. He stands behind the rest of his team, guarding the dollar. He is the opposite of a quarterback who calls the signals and takes offensive action.

The pull sheets of the budget message, made available to journalists over the preceding week-end, contained a telling typographical error. The last line on the cover read: SELECTED BUDGET STATMENTS.

The E that was missing was E for Effort.

Inflation and Pensions

HARD ON THE heels of Arthur Burns' proposal that as a means of increasing economic stability, tax rates be made variable, with the level of taxation tied to the level of economic activity, comes a suggestion from economics professor Donald A. Corbin of the University of California (Riverside) that state insurance laws be readjusted so as to permit the purchase of variable annuities whose value changes with the cost of living.

At present, retired people dependent on pensions are among the hardest-hit by inflation because the levels of retirement income foreseen and provided for during their working lives become more and more inadequate as the dollar loses its value through rising prices. Pension plans that produce fixed yields from investments in bonds and mortgages afford no protection against inflation: the safety they afford from other types of risk is vitiated as the dollar they provide shrinks to fractional value.

In 1952, a nationwide group of college professors started a new type of plan under which half of the monthly contribution to a pension fund continues to be invested in bonds and mortgages, but the other half is invested in common stocks, whose value tends to increase during periods of inflation. Some twenty companies have adopted similar plans; nearly all airlines have such arrangements for their pilots because of the pilots' longer retirement period.

In most states, however, purchase of such annuities is still impossible because of the provisions of the insurance laws. Several important life insurance companies, led by Prudential, the country's second-biggest such firm, are making efforts to get these laws changed, with currently good prospects in New York and New Jersey. But a prodding public opinion is needed to encourage all states to permit individuals to buy annuities for pensions, thereby giving the retired some additional protection against inflation as well as deflation.

Sale of the *Daily News*

MORE THAN 35 years ago Ben Hecht dedicated one of his first big hits, "1001 Afternoons in Chicago" to "My Friend, the *Daily News*." It wasn't a fantasy. The paper had personality. It was capable of being a friend of intelligent men, not only those to whom it gave employment, but also those who were related to it only as readers.

This was true because the men who produced the *Chicago Daily News* were not content to give the public what it wants. Because they knew their own business they knew better than the average layman what constitutes good newspaper service. They gave Chicago a superb foreign coverage when there was no insistent demand for it. They gave it excellent coverage of cultural interests, particularly literature and the graphic arts when there was even less demand for that sort of thing.

This was not business, this was professionalism. A lawyer does not ask his client, nor a doctor his patient what kind of advice or medicine he wants. He assumes that what the client wants is to win his case, or that the patient wants to get rid of his colic, and he offers what his professional judgment tells him will serve that end most effectively. So the men who produced the *Daily News,* assuming that what the Chicago public really wanted was to be informed, used their best judgment to that end and lifted a craft into a profession.

But that was in the days when the economic factor was far less exigent in the collection and dissemination of news. Now that a capital investment of many millions and an organization certainly of hundreds and perhaps of thousands are required to produce a first-rate newspaper in a city much smaller than Chicago, professionalism of that kind may easily become ruinously expensive. And perhaps that is why the *Daily News,* after having

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declined in recent years in both quality and influence, has just been sold—to Marshall Field's *Sun-Times*. Efficiency is certainly served by the modern system, and perhaps the spread of accurate information is accelerated. Nevertheless there is something to regret in the passing of a newspaper of the kind that a literary craftsman delighted to call "my friend."

Why Castro Won

THE COVERAGE of the Cuban revolution by American correspondents has been extensive and in some cases brilliant. But for a fuller understanding of why the outbreak took place and why Fidel Castro succeeded, we are indebted to the foreign press—notably the French and British.

The revolution, according to European correspondents, is unique in Latin American history because it is the work of the peasants, supported by intellectuals of the upper middle class, in which the urban proletariat played practically no part. Before Batista returned to power on March 10, 1952, the Cuban labor unions were in the hands of the Communists. The dictator subsequently went through the motions of opposing the unions and their leaders, but in fact they worked with and for his government. One of the government's many terrorist organizations was specifically assigned the task of suppressing anti-Communism, but the day Batista fell there were no real Communists in jail—though there were numerous Castro supporters. The labor leaders had sold out for money to the regime, and the workers preferred social security of the manner of Peron in Argentina to throwing in their lot with the opponents of the dictator.

The revolution was in essence a revolt of the back country, the provinces against Havana. Two-thirds of the men in Castro's armies were *guajiros*—poor peasants. In common with other Latin American dictators, Batista had served the big land-owners and the rich industrialists; he had also counted on the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of the city workers.

In the countryside, especially in the Eastern provinces, Castro offered the only true revolutionary promise that had any meaning—land reform. With it, he won over the peasants who had no work in the "dead time" between the two sugar cane harvests. The lower middle classes of the province went along too, partly because they had no other place to go. And the future now is clouded by the gap between the simple and direct economic motivation of the rank-and-file *Fidelistas* and the romantic political rhetoric of democratic freedom of the intellectuals in the leadership.

How did a motley lot of untrained peasants led by intellectuals defeat Batista's professional army and police, with the dollars they had from the United States and the arms they had from England? Here too, true or false, European correspondents provide what may be answers. First of all, the army commanders, eager to follow the example of Batista and his clique in getting rich quick, used techniques which in the end were for the regime. When the *Fidelista* movement was getting started and seemed to offer no real threat, the top men in the army made money by selling arms, secretly of course, to anyone who came along. When regular soldiers were killed in skirmishes, their officers kept their names on the rolls instead of listing them as casualties, and then pocketed their pay. Bit by bit the arms of the small garrisons in Oriente province fell into the hands of the rebels. A policy of the most brutal terror carried out by the army and police drove young men into the mountains and into Castro's ranks. As long ago as March, 1957, Castro said he would accept new recruits, only if they brought their own guns. Batista's regular army, moreover, was not only venal, but incompetent and cowardly. Every time Havana announced an offensive, the regulars lost many men and whole arsenals of arms were lost with them. On the Castro side, strict discipline was maintained, and gradually the population of the countryside was helping him without reservations. Even the priests and the bishops of the countryside went over to Castro, and support came in from Cuban exiles abroad.

As the regime lost ground, denying all the while that it was in danger and getting arms almost until the end from England, the atrocities it perpetrated became worse. The reaction against the final phase of futile Batista horror which at the end produced the general strike in Havana, has been showing itself in the executions of some of the worst of Batista's assassins, after summary trial or no trial at all. It is doubtful if Castro could entirely check the reaction, even if he wanted to.

Truman to the Attack

HARRY TRUMAN in a syndicated article on January 19 added a new dimension to the discussion of reciprocal visits by Soviet and American leaders. We are familiar with the view that there is something unrespectable about talking with top Russians. But Mr. Truman now suggests that it may be subversive as well. "Diplomacy by press interviews, special audiences or fishing expeditions," he writes,

> can only compound an already complicated situation. . . . I would caution some of our well-meaning, self-appointed, self-assuming peacemakers to be careful lest they forget, in their ardor, that the President makes foreign policy and they may inadvertently lend themselves to the propaganda purposes of our adversaries.

And at a later point in his article, the former President warns that "in some instances interviews by those who

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are not journalists have lent themselves unwittingly to maneuvers of the Kremlin to appeal to our people over the heads of the government."

The identity of "those who are not journalists" is no mystery: we recall only seven Americans in this category who have interviewed Khrushchev: Democratic leaders William Benton, Allen Ellender, Adlai Stevenson, Mrs. Roosevelt (or is she a "journalist"?), Hubert Humphrey, and businessmen Eric Johnston and Cyrus Eaton. If Mr. Truman has some undisclosed evidence that the national interest has been damaged by what these men said or were told in the Kremlin, he is not sharing it. Quite the contrary assumption can be made, that both American opinion and the Soviet leaders are better informed for the frank exchanges that have taken place. Or perhaps Mr. Truman has other considerations in mind, including the ambushing of potential Democratic candidates for 1960 other than his own.

Whatever his motives, surely there was no necessity for him to remind us or the Russians of the dismal truism that Mr. Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are responsible for our foreign policy. And for him to imply, as he clearly does in this article (probably written by his biographer William Hillman with the advice, consent and urging of Dean Acheson) that unofficial talks "serve no useful purpose in our relations with the Communist world" is just plain silly.

Halleck's Hoax

IF THE White House staff did connive to oust Joe Martin as House Minority Leader because he was "too independent" of the Administration, they already have cause for disappointment. The "insurrection" which put Charlie Halleck of Indiana in control has landed a number of unmodern Republicans in better spots than they occupied in Martin days.

To the powerful House Rules Committee to direct legislative traffic the new regime named two of the most backward-looking members of the GOP, Carroll Reece of Tennessee and Homer Budge of Idaho, passing over more liberal Stuyvesant Wainwright of New York who made a strong bid for the post. This leaves the Rules Committee without a single Eastern Republican member.

The important Ways and Means Committee, which among other things has charge of bills concerning international trade—a major Eisenhower interest—has four new appointees—Representatives Knox (Mich.), Utt (Calif.), Betts (Ohio) and Alger (Tex.)—all four enemies of reciprocal trade. Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, a strong supporter of a liberal trade program, had been promised a Ways and Means assignment last year, but was ignored by Halleck.

And the Republican Policy Committee has been reconstructed along much more conservative lines. As Policy Chairman, Halleck has named one of his "insurgent" leaders, Rep. John Byrnes of Wisconsin, who voted against Eisenhower proposals 52 percent of the time in 1958 and scored nine minuses and only one plus on *The New Republic's* 10 key votes in the 85th Congress.

Monitoring Atomic Tests

SECRETARY DULLES has so far avoided pouring gasoline on the fire which opponents of any atomic test ban are seeking to build under the Geneva negotiations. He was reminded at his news conference of the Killian Committee pronouncement that technical data arising from the October atomic explosions in Nevada suggest it will be "more difficult" than the Geneva conference has estimated to distinguish underground explosions from earthquakes. Does this mean the US will pull out of the Geneva talks? Mr. Dulles replied that the inspection arrangements agreed to last summer by the Soviet and US technicians was "perhaps inadequate." But he accentuated the positive:

> Very careful studies are being made to see whether there cannot be found ways of detection which can really be brought within the compass of the original report of the experts, so that no serious or revolutionary change would be required.

On the same day Hans Bethe, a member of the Killian Committee, emphasized that an effective test inspection system can be developed; improved seismic devices will make it possible to detect tests without enlarging the 180-station monitoring network foreseen last summer.

Any test detection system is valid only in terms of the then-existing state of the inspection art. In seeking to minimize the risks in any monitoring agreement, we should not forget that the primary goal—with possible fourth and fifth nuclear powers in view—is to establish the most workable, acceptable system possible *at the time*.

The way to take into account new evidence such as that cited in the Killian Committee statement is to provide for the revision of the system in the light of new possibilities of evasion—and detection. Significantly, the Geneva experts' conference last year specifically envisioned revision based on research carried on by the international inspectorate. Chapter Four of the Technical Pact, citing the functions of the inspection body, speaks of its "providing assistance in putting into effect a scientific research program, with the aim of raising the scientific standards of the system." Another function would be "the development, testing and acceptance of the measuring apparatus and of the equipment, and the stating of criteria for the siting of the control posts." The Federation of American Scientists, urging that the new evidence on detection of underground explosions not alter the US

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posture at Geneva, has observed that "relatively little" effort has so far gone into designing inspection methods, and that "as more emphasis is placed on controlling the arms race we may reasonably expect that the techniques of international control will be improved."

There are security risks in any inspection system—for both sides—and all parties concerned have known this from the start. Sen. Hubert Humphrey's Disarmament Subcommittee, which had so much to do with creating a favorable US opinion for participation in the Geneva talks, emphasized in its 1957 report that:

> it would be deceiving to the American people and the people of the world to advertise any plan as perfect. Every proposal entails risks, risks as to the possibilities of clandestine evasion and as to military security. . . . In essence, the basic question is to decide whether the risks of doing something to curtail the threat of war by reducing armaments are less than the risks of doing nothing and allowing the arms race to continue indefinitely.

German Reunification

WE BELIEVE that the time has come when that division [of Germany] cannot be continued without very great peril to all of us and that the next step is to unite Germany through free elections. . . . *John Foster Dulles*

Conference of Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, France, USSR—Jan. 25 to Feb. 18, 1954

ONLY A FREELY elected all-German Government can undertake on behalf of a reunified Germany obligations which will inspire confidence on the part of other countries. . . . Such a government can only be established through free elections throughout Germany for an all-German national assembly.

Declaration signed by the US, UK, France and West Germany, July 12, 1957

Q.—Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reuniting Germany?

DULLES—Well, we have never said that. . . . It seems to us the natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.

Press Conference, Jan. 13, 1959

IT WILL BE most interesting to see what happens—whether Dulles' moving foot moves the ball and chain along with it, or whether the ball and chain jerks the foot back again.

Eric Sevareid

CBS News, Jan. 13, 1959

CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER called in the US Ambassador today to express West Germany's concern over remarks by Secretary of State Dulles on the reunification of Germany.

The New York Times, Jan. 14, 1959

THE WEST GERMAN Ambassador spent more than an hour with the Secretary late today. He said afterward that Mr. Dulles had reaffirmed that it was the policy of the US Government to seek the reunification of Germany through free elections.

The New York Times, Jan. 14, 1959

"Can't we do something more than stand firm?"

THOSE WHO demand free elections as the first step to German reunification are not urgently interested in bringing about reunification. *Walter Lippmann*

Jan. 15, 1959

"Pacification" of Algeria

WATCHING de Gaulle's progress is like watching a trapeze artist over Niagara. One holds one's breath. Thus far the performance has been superb, nonetheless so for de Gaulle's acts of clemency last week for jailed Algerian rebels and suspects—the most generous since the beginning of hostilities in 1954. It was a decision that took courage and was welcomed with no enthusiasm by extremists or even moderates among the French in Algeria.

The composition of the new French Government is also evidence of de Gaulle's surprising political agility. To make peace in Algeria, he chose as Prime Minister Michel Debré—a brilliant legal mind but reported to be more nationalist than de Gaulle himself. And to carry out the electoral mandate which made the new Gaullist party (the UNR) the dominant party in the National

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Assembly, Debré—himself a UNR man—has appointed a government in which of the 21 Ministers, nine are non-party "technicians" and seven belong to parties other than the UNR.

Moreover, the four most important ministries—Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance and Interior—have been given to non-party men or those not affiliated with the UNR. Jacques Soustelle, who has been considered the most influential and perhaps dangerous associate of de Gaulle has been rewarded with a specially created but unmistakably nebulous new post which is to embrace France's overseas territories, the Sahara and atomic energy. But since the atomic energy program is largely a financial and technical matter, and since de Gaulle is directly responsible for territorial policies, Soustelle's authority, while not negligible, is certainly diminished.

The Ministry of Justice, which must now remedy past miscarriages of justice and alleviate the conditions of confinement of rebels or suspects has been entrusted to de Gaulle's intimate, Edmond Michelet, who probably reflects the President's liberal views on Algeria as closely as anyone in the government.

De Gaulle speaks of "pacification" of Algeria; he also speaks of "transformation," and to these he adds the requirement of "universal suffrage." It is premature even to guess what these will mean in practice, or whether de Gaulle will succeed this time in overcoming the hostility of those Algerians who compose the FLN "government" in Tunis. The President has yet to use that inflammatory word "independence," nor have the FLN rebels given any sign they might modify their demand for full independence. Furthermore, de Gaulle has not changed his view that the FLN will not be accepted as the sole bargaining agent for Algerian nationalist sentiment.

The most logical first step would seem to be the convening of a conference between Algerian Moslem and European representatives to discuss a cease-fire and terms of eventual political settlement. This is the course which Messali Hadj, leader of the Algerian Nationalist Movement who has just been released from prison and given full freedom within France, again publicly advocates. But the FLN thinks as little of Messali Hadj and his rival nationalist movement as it does of the French and today holds two of Messali Hadj's closest supporters as prisoners in Cairo—through the courtesy of Nasser.

Still, if an armistice in Korea was President Eisenhower's first order of business, peace in Algeria is equally de Gaulle's first and most difficult assignment. Vague or contradictory as his statements to date sound, they do suggest that the door to negotiations will once more be opened—however quietly—for talks with the FLN during the next three months before the Assembly reconvenes in Paris in mid-April for its first regular sessions. As Minister of State Andre Malraux told the press: "Since there have always been wars, there have always been negotiations."

A COMMUNICATION

Art Criticism—"Advanced" Or "Retardataire"?

SIRS:

IN THE December 15 number, *The New Republic* attacked "Art Buccaneering" and commented disparagingly on the Metropolitan Museum's acquisition of a large painting by Jackson Pollock. I wrote a letter to the Editors pointing out a number of factual errors concerning the time and circumstances of the acquisition. . . . I then went on to say that it is typical of the times that a politically "advanced" journal should support only retardataire or commonplace provincial art. The quantity of errors of fact in *The New Republic's* rare discussions of painting and sculpture are not mere symptoms of naïveté, but of an aggressive indifference to the fields as a whole. Which in turn, I believe, is one of several indications that politically "advanced" journals no longer think about Politics at all, but think as politicians; they are not interested in political ideas, but in effective counter-punches.

Witness your recent editorial comment on my letter, under the heading "Mystique (that sweet old word that lets politicians think they are thinking) of the Drip."

First you counter-punch neatly by attacking the prose of some sentences lifted from *Art News* reviews—although why Editors who use such similes as "held aloft as the apogee" should get into an argument about language is beyond me. But even if one grants the fact that such criticism doesn't read easily, or even well, what has this got to do with the art? Why doesn't *The New Republic* get itself a critic who will write to its Editors' taste about advanced painting and sculpture, instead of publishing the standard cant of the 1930s about the style of the 1920s.

After the counter-punch, a right cross: you proceed to identify Action Painting with therapy, hint that advanced artists might be mentally disordered, talk about the "drip school" in quotes (whose quotes, by the way?) and about "uninhibited daubing," "gurgle and gush"—in short, in the language of the conservative's attack on anything new.

One expects this from *The National Review* and the American Legion's magazine and the late *Facts Forum* They are just as convinced about the evils of New York and Action Painting as you are. But from *The New Republic,* from *The Nation, The Reporter,* even *The New Statesman and Nation,* one had expected sympathy for original work by dedicated artists—not what they give, the contemptuous academic sneer. But perhaps this expectation was naïve. Political magazines today are "above" political or cultural ideas, beyond metaphysics, secure in the tactical stratospheres where world powers fight to achieve the second-best.

THOMAS B. HESS
Executive Editor, Art News

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. . . and an editorial reply

WE ACKNOWLEDGE one error: the Jackson Pollock painting to which we referred previously ("Autumn Rhythm") was purchased by the Metropolitan Museum of New York in June, 1957, and not, as we reported, "within the past month." The Metropolitan never discloses what it pays for a picture, but the list price was $30,000; that is the figure we used. We also said the painting could have been bought several years earlier for $1,000. *Art News* believes $10,000 would be more accurate, but that is a matter of opinion.

It is not a matter of opinion whether *The New Republic's* discussions of painting and sculpture are "rare." Written by Frank Getlein, they have appeared every other week since January, 1957. Mr. Getlein responds to pictures in *his* way and neither asks for nor receives "guidance" from the editors. Nevertheless, as his article on page 21 of this issue illustrates, he is a critic who is very much to the "Editors' taste." Also, our editorial comments on what *Art News* considers the "masterpieces" of abstract expressionism are not, as Mr. Hess thinks, the result of "aggressive indifference" but of aggressive antagonism.

We don't know whether it is possible to write both sensibly and sympathetically about much of the abstract, contemporary painting to which *Art News* is devoted. Mr. Hess admits with admirable candor that such criticism often does not read easily or well. But that is the least of it. For us, *Art News* on art is as clear as consomme compared to *Art News* on world politics. We may be "retardataire," but let there be no mistake: the "tactical stratospheres where world powers fight to achieve the second best" leave us anything but secure. We're dizzy.

THE EDITORS

Turkey's Strategic Military Value

Ankara

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC value to the West has become such a platitude that one is inclined to forget that it is true. Take a pair of compasses and stick the point anywhere in Turkish territory and you will find the free point able to range over areas of the Soviet Union unreachable from any other NATO base. IRBM's on the Black Sea coast, when in place, will not only be able to pulverize Moscow as easily as Moscow could pulverize Istanbul, but can reach far into the great Soviet industrial complex beyond the Urals. Strategic Air Command bombers based in Turkey could penetrate to almost any part of the vast Soviet Union.

Thus, Khrushchev's recent remark to Walter Lippmann about the uselessness to the West of advanced bases like Turkey need to be examined with some skepticism. The Soviet Premier told Mr. Lippmann that he believes he has found the solution to any preventive war launched by the West in Soviet intermediate-range missiles, and that in the case of general war, NATO forces would arrive in Turkey too late for the funeral. That view is apparently not taken very seriously by Washington, which is preparing to conclude a new series of bilateral defense pacts with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Mr. K's remarks are, indeed, a little difficult to understand. The fact that Turkish cities could be smashed in the first few minutes of a nuclear war, simultaneously with the smashing of Soviet cities from Turkish bases, proves nothing except the imperative need for both sides to limit any war which might break out to conventional, or at worst, tactical atomic weapons. The absurd idea of pulling out of places like Turkey altogether and relying on the ICBM, apart from the political havoc it would cause, would make impossible any form of defensive retaliation except mutual annihilation.

In anything short of a global holocaust, Turkey is as necessary as ever. In conventional war, the Turkish army—which is the biggest in NATO—would be at a premium. Its value is enhanced by the views of many experts who believe that, in the event of war, neither side would dare order the use even of tactical atomic weapons, let alone the hydrogen bomb.

Turkey today has 25 divisions committed to NATO. In the opinion of reliable authorities, this army could hold up a Russian conventional attack for long enough to cover the arrival of NATO forces from Germany or elsewhere in the West. The Turkish air force—consisting of about 500 F. 84's and 86's, and a few F.100's—could also knock a respectable hole in any Soviet airborne attack during the interval while more powerful allied forces were on the way.

It is sometimes claimed that the large size of the Turkish army is a burden which is the major cause of the economic difficulties which almost brought Turkey to bankruptcy last year. This is a myth. When the low cost of maintaining Turkish soldiers and the volume of US military and NATO infrastructure aid is taken into account, the Turkish armed forces mop up a mere 5 or 6 percent of the gross national product. This compares with about 13 percent in the US. Apart from this, there is already unemployment in Turkey, and to demobilize part of the army could be disastrous. Turkey's economic difficulties are largely the result of too-hasty, unplanned development. The size of the army has nothing whatever to do with it.

DAVID HOTHAM

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SOUTHERNERS AND SCHOOLS—III

The Segregationists Go North

by HELEN FULLER

THE STATES of the Deep South are shifting their strategy of "massive resistance" from defense to attack. They will lose their leader, Virginia's Governor Almond, on January 19 (Robert E. Lee's birthday) if the courts, as expected, on that day declare void the laws Virginia passed to evade the 1954 decision desegregating the public schools. But the six remaining Confederate states which have refused to take even one step toward compliance with the 1954 Court order are resolved not to go Virginia's way without much more of a struggle. There is plenty of fight left in the Eastlands, the Russells, the Talmadges and the young fire-eating Governors of Alabama and Georgia. And they are now about to take the battle into enemy territory. A second battle of Gettysburg is about to begin, this one to be fought with the techniques of psychological warfare, aimed at the public outside the South, the Congress and conservative leaders in both major political parties. Object: to win sympathy for the segregationist view behind the enemy lines, support for curbing the powers of the Supreme Court by law, and agreement to nullify the New Reconstruction of 1954 as the Compromise of 1877 nullified Reconstruction before.

The first task—making common cause with new allies outside their region—the New Confederates approach with great zest, for most of them sincerely believe that down inside most people outside the South feel toward the Negro about the way Southerners do. The trouble, they feel, is that the average person above the Mason-Dixon Line doesn't understand how fair and kind—how separate but equal—the South is willing to be. The misunderstanding comes, they further believe, largely because of the "paper curtain" which the Northern press has placed around the South; "all they print is the gory stories." "Lay your case before the American people," Senator Eastland recently assured the convention of the Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation in Jackson, "and you will be surprised to find how similar their opinions are to those of your own." And so the massive resisters have decided to tell the rest of America "just the honest story," "with no Bilbo business."

This Southern campaign to convert the North, East and West will not be of the order of magnitude of a Billy Graham Crusade, but it is well-organized and well-financed. Some states have already allocated public funds to propaganda bureaus which are pouring out pamphlets and "fact sheets" on the shortcomings of the Negro and the Supreme Court. Over the Great Seal of the State of Louisiana, the Joint State Legislative Committee, headed by Sen. W. M. Rainach, who speaks for the Louisiana White Citizens Councils in the legislature and is a leading candidate for Governor next year, has printed as a full-page advertisement in *The New York Herald-Tribune* a message addressed "To the People of New York City" on "The Position of the South on Race Relations" (See p. 11). The Committee subsequently "distributed several thousand tear sheets of the ad to key officials, publications and organizations throughout the United States," Senator Rainach says. "And after running out of all the tear sheets except a handful, we reprinted the ad in mail sheet form and distributed several thousand of these sheets also."

Senator Eastland is urging that the other defiant states go and do likewise. Citing the *Herald-Tribune* ad as an example of the wise use of public funds, Eastland told the Farm Bureau convention that "the Southern people have got to lay their case before the nation, and we must use our tax money to get the job done."

There are leaders in all six bitter-end states who agree. Out of Alabama has come a new "Putnam Letter Committee," headed by James E. Simpson, leading Birmingham Dixiecrat and lawyer for some of the biggest of Alabama's "Big Mules." The Committee's purpose is to publicize a beguiling "Dear Mr. President" letter, signed by Carleton Putnam, a Northerner who has spent many years as an airlines executive in the South. The "Putnam Letter," has already been published as a large ad in *The New York Times* and is to be placed in newspapers all over the country. Arguing that the Court decision in the school case is personal opinion, not law, and that equal protection under law is not a right in the United States but a social privilege, the Letter declares:

> Neither the North, nor the court, has any holy mandate inherent in the trend of the times or the progress of liberalism to reform society in the South. In the matter of schools, rights to equal education are inseparably bound up with rights to freedom of association and, in

(Continued on page 12)

HELEN FULLER, *a Southerner by birth and education, has just returned from a survey through the Southern states. This is the third of several interpretive reports.*

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To The People of New York City

The Position of the South on Race Relations

Recent tragic events in the integrated schools of Washington, D. C., Kansas City, Little Rock, and your own New York City, suggest that an accurate presentation of the views of Southern people on the race question might receive sympathetic consideration in the North and might even contribute to the solution of a problem in which we are now all concerned.

A PROBLEM UNIQUE WITHIN OUR NATION

Here in the United States, we are witnessing an unprecedented attempt by certain white and Negro leaders to force the Negro people of our country to abandon their own culture and mores, lose themselves physically and culturally within other races, and commit racial suicide.

Meanwhile, outside of the United States, every dynamic racial group in the world pridefully promotes its own culture. In view of their examples, should we not look twice before we leap?

In looking, we do not propose here to review the influences behind the "integration" movement. (For detailed analysis of a major influence we recommend that you review "Subversion in Racial Unrest," a documented study recently released by this Committee). Rather, let us here consider the logic of the movement and its ultimate effect on a country that we all love and cherish.

THE AMERICAN MAJORITY: A BLEND OF HOMOGENEOUS PEOPLES

You may ask: Doesn't this great country of ours represent a melting pot of different races? From a scientific standpoint, the answer is an unequivocal – NO!

The vast majority of this nation represents a blending of like peoples of common European ancestry, rather than a mixing of divergent races. But the energy and vitality which made America a great nation arose neither from racial self-idolatry nor racial suicide – it was an outgrowth of a passionate love of individual liberty, balanced by a sense of justice and individual responsibility which makes this liberty possible. On such a foundation, a new nation was created, capable of winning and retaining the love and loyalty of peoples of different races, different cultures and different religions.

WHAT ABOUT THE AMERICAN NEGRO?

We in the South think of our colored friends as Negro Americans, rather than as American Negroes. The normally cordial relationships between Southern white and colored people are regulated by a set of conventions or customs, the product of years of experiment and experience in adjusting to a bi-racial society.

RACIAL PATTERNS--A COMMUNITY MATTER

These customs vary widely from state to state and indeed from community to community. Until May 17, 1954 each community in the South was a laboratory in which many of these customs were being constantly examined and revised to meet changing conditions. Each community adapted itself to the problems which confronted it.

It is significant that all of the communities in the South and, indeed, many of the communities in the North, agreed that separation of the races in the fields of elementary and secondary education was essential.

THE SOLUTION NORTH AND SOUTH

This method of adjustment, which has been loosely referred to as "Segregation", enabled both the Negro and white people in the South to overcome the devastating effects of the War Between the States and pile up a record of progress second to none in history.

We believe it will, in practice, enable our Northern friends to adjust themselves to the more than one-half of the Negroes in this country who will live in the North by 1980.

A DANGEROUS PARALLEL

Now we are told that this is all wrong – that each community must conform to one unvarying racial pattern – complete integration – prescribed and enforced by a central governmental authority. But, the disastrous results of this policy are causing Americans to ask themselves: **Is forced racial integration the answer?**

At one time the belief was prevalent that all must attend the same church to prosper in the next world, as well as in this one. Many futile attempts of powerful groups in Europe to force their religious views on others only succeeded in dividing the continent into hostile camps. Ghastly wars and senseless massacres occurred in the conflicts over the rights of mankind to individuality, **this time in the field of religion.**

Today peoples of different religions may attend different churches without "degradation" or "psychological injury" to their personalities. Indeed, no one questions the right of a great religion to prohibit non-members from participating in certain of its rituals or partaking of its sacraments. **"Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other!"**

THE BEACON OF THE FUTURE

The trend to differentiation, racial and religious, represents a natural law, as well as a basic human right. Any attempt to force a rigid conformity in such matters of human relations must inevitably result in a repetition of the deadly European pattern of religious conflict.

Upon the establishment of workable race relations hinges the very fate of our great country. In the Talmud is a saying to the effect that **time may, in some situations, resolve problems which cannot be solved by human intelligence at the moment. Now is the hour for Americans of all races to heed the wisdom of this counsel.**

The Joint Legislative Committee

State of Louisiana

Baton Rouge

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> the South at least, may require that both be considered simultaneously. (In using the word "association" here, I mean the right to associate with whom you please, and the right not to associate with whom you please.)

The Putnam Committee raises funds privately for its promotion. But Florida legislator William H. Reedy shares Eastland's view that such projects are public business. He proposes a program of Southern aid to federal education on the Southern view, to be supported by appropriations of $1 million per year from each state participating. "The South must sell its ideas the way Hollywood producers sell starlets," Reedy says. And the Conference of Southern Governors has invited him to its next meeting to discuss details.

(Georgia's Sen. Richard Russell is for educating the rest of the country to Southern problems, too, but he would let those on the receiving end pay for the privilege. He promises us a bill this year to provide federal aid to Southern Negroes who wish to move to states with smaller Negro populations in order "to give each state an equal share of the race problem.")

THE FUNDS the South is willing to invest in enlightenment of the North are supposed to yield dividends this very year in the form of aid toward passage of the Smith bill to curb the Supreme Court.

First introduced in 1955, HR 3—which would repeal the long-standing doctrine of federal preemption and place primary jurisdiction in the state courts unless specifically withheld by Congress—passed the House last year by a large majority of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans (241-155). In the end-of-session confusion the Senate defeated it by only one vote. Rep. Howard Smith (D, Va.) has reintroduced HR 3 in the new Congress and because of his position as chairman of the powerful Rules Committee should be able to push it through the House again, even though the measure has lost supporters because of Republican casualties in the November election. For the same reason the new Senate should be more opposed to passage of HR 3 than the old, but the foes of the Court are also vastly more determined.

The Smith bill of itself is an important Southern objective, as a symbol of antagonism to the Court's leadership in forcing the segregation issue in the most direct way since Reconstruction days. But even should passage fail again, a close hard-fought decision would be worth the price of the propaganda effort required to produce it. A lengthy battle over the court curbing measure in advance of consideration of new civil rights enforcement legislation—which Southerners could easily manage with their command of traffic through their committee chairmanships—would contribute to their larger objective: preventing the Congress from adding the force of its approval to the position of the Court on desegregating public schools "with all deliberate speed."

At all costs the massive resisters must prevent reenforcements from reaching the Judiciary, which stands today as the lone leader in the New Reconstruction. The murmurs of encouragement to the courts which have risen faintly from the Department of Justice and the ill-calculated relief offered by the President in the Little Rock affair hardly qualify as major assists. Congress, in effect, has remained neutral. And it is imperative for those who defy the Court to keep it that way. Lyndon Johnson helped a lot by taming the new Senate a few hours after it walked into his cage, and so leaving the filibuster in good working condition. But a hard-fought, even if finally losing battle to punish the court for its recent conduct would offer invaluable opportunities to make sure that Congress does not suddenly decide to get behind the Supreme Court. In the midst of debate and backstage maneuvers there is always room for wheeling and dealing. When the vote is close, trades can sometimes be made which change other close votes on other days. In such a situation the South's polished professionals would surprise everyone if they walked out of the cloakrooms without a stack of IOU's payable when federal enforcement of school desegregation became the question before the house.

If the states which shout "Never!" can prevent the 86th Congress from passing legislation supporting the Court, they will be free to attempt the next huge step in their plan for total escape from the toils of the New Reconstruction: Persuade the reformers to give up. Historically, this is not so far-fetched as it sounds. The ephemeral historic importance "of such earlier landmarks as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, the Dred Scott decision of 1857, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1875, the Fourteenth Amendment of 1867, or, for that matter, the Volstead Act of 1919—all of which were in some degree nullified by events or public sentiment—should remind us," Vann Woodward, the leading historian of the American Reconstruction period remarks. " . . . how precarious are the fortunes of American statesmanship when it operates against the mass opposition of a significant section of the country."

"Reconstruction," Professor Woodward observes,

> affords the most extreme example in our history of an all-out effort by the majority to impose its will upon a recalcitrant and unwilling minority region. . . . In spite of the relative weakness and helplessness of the resistant South, in spite of the determined idealism of the Northern reformers . . . the fact is that the great experiment ended in disillusionment and default. The gains made on paper were never fully implemented in practice, or they were eroded away by compromise, concession and "interpretation." Apathy and indifference replaced the original idealism of the reformers. It was the will of the defeated, discredited and, for a time, helpless South that prevailed in the end.

(The next article in this series will describe how the South hopes to nullify the New Reconstruction.)

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Southeast Asia

How Happy a New Year?

by DENIS WARNER

SELF-GOVERNMENT has often brought more frustration than good cheer to Southeast Asia. The notable exception is Malaya, where independence is new and highly treasured, relations with the former colonial power are still good, and the predicted decline in administrative efficiency has been slowed down by the government's readiness to accept external advice and assistance. While none of the Southeast Asian leaders saw independence as the end of the revolution but only the beginning of the struggle to evolve new societies through education, industrial advance and greater national incomes, few anticipated the complexity of the problems they would face or had the administrative competence to cope with them. Too often, therefore, the struggle for Asia has developed into a contest between right-wing armed forces on the one hand and Communism, or anarchy, on the other. In no less than five South and Southeast Asian countries anarchy, or Communism, has been checked in recent months only by the intervention of military leaders and armed forces.

Ceylon needed martial law to straighten out its Sinhalese-Tamil problems. Indonesia's success against the Sjafruddin rebel movement and firmer line against the Communists may be ascribed principally to General Haris Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the increasing authority he and other non-Communist military leaders have begun to exercise in political life. In Burma, the fiction that U Nu invited General Ne Win to become Prime Minister for six months has been politely preserved in the Burmese manner, while in fact the Army take-over, if more dignified than General Ayub Khan's pistol-point dismissal of President Iskander Mirza in Pakistan, was a simple *coup d'état*.

Some Western observers, including many who ought to know better, view these developments with satisfaction. They welcome the military interventions as basically anti-Communist and assume that since many of the officers have been trained either in Britain or the United States they are pro-Western. While the first assumption is broadly correct, the second, in the light of experience in Iraq and Egypt, is at least dubious. Even more significantly, the officer élite of the Thai and Pakistani armies have little in common with the people they now rule. Though in neither country is internal Communism a serious threat, the situation has been created in which even the stunted democratic growths that did exist hitherto have been uprooted and the only remaining political force with dynamic appeal is the illegal and underground Communist Party, which may be expected to seize the opportunities thus presented for infiltration and subversion at the grass-roots level.

In Burma and Indonesia the situation is somewhat more cheerful. Burma's General Ne Win, whose Army is a "people's army" and claims to have at least as much influence in the villages as do the Communists, plans to embark on a two-fold campaign designed to break the Communist leadership in the National United Front and to isolate the villagers from Communist influence before the April elections which mark the end of martial law.

Similarly, in Indonesia, the Army, which grew out of local resistance movements to the Dutch between 1945 and 1949, has close links with the people. This was the strength that the young rebel colonels of Indonesia counted on in the Celebes and Sumatra where the dissident regional support was the rebels' only strength. On the government side General Nasution has organized his own national front, through which he hopes to strengthen the Army's ties with the civil population and to outflank both the rebels and the Communists. His problem is no easy one. If the rebels are no longer a direct threat, the Communist problem is still gravely serious: in the current series of regional elections, which, because of the revolt, are still incomplete, the Communists have polled 7,740,000 votes, compared with 5,430,000 for the Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars), and 4,160,000 for the Masjumi Party, whose identification with the rebels

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DENIS WARNER, *an Australian specialist on the Far East, has just completed a tour of Southeast Asia. This is the second of two articles; the first article, "Peking and the Overseas Chinese," appeared in the January 12 issue of* The New Republic.

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has caused it to suffer a reverse from which it may not recover.

In the struggle for Asia, which really is a struggle for the allegiance of its people, this reliance on military leaders, whether they work at the village level or seek merely to rule by imposing their authority from the top, may be a satisfactory temporary expedient; but it is a poor way to fight Communism in underdeveloped and underprivileged areas. The assumption that military rule will bring about a measure of efficiency that was lacking under previous administrations in the countries under consideration is well based. What appears to be lacking, however, is the proper appreciation that the democratic type of government which the West hoped to sponsor and to assist through schemes such as the Colombo Plan is disappearing, and that the alternative we are backing now in opposition to Communism, with its considerable, if false, mass appeal, is military dictatorship whose virtues, even in Indonesia and Burma, may not be immediately apparent at the levels where the Communists work and flourish.

Ba Maw, Burma's wartime leader under the Japanese, once remarked to me in Rangoon that the West's fundamental error in its approach to Asia was in putting bread before ideas. "Offer any Burman his choice between a loaf of bread and a good slogan like 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity,' and I'll bet you he'll take the slogan every time," he said. Asian nations, he suggested, would rather have reason to be proud than well fed; and it is this feeling that the Communist aid programs have deliberately exploited. Both Moscow and Peking regard diplomacy, trade and aid and propaganda as interwoven. One serves to further the purposes of the other. Moscow won enormous goodwill in Afghanistan, for instance, by paving Kabul's streets and providing buses and trucks to run on them—projects turned down, incidentally, by the United States in favor of longer-term economic aid and desert reclamation and irrigation projects that Afghans have never seen and don't appear to care about, anyway. Today, with the Soviet Union building a modern airport at Kabul to accommodate the delegations from South Asia and the Middle East that flock to Moscow by the Afghan back door, Kabul, by deliberate Moscow design, is becoming a show piece for "peaceful co-existence" and Russian altruism. A new hotel in Rangoon, where government officials have always been red-faced when obliged to ask visiting international delegations to sleep two and three to a room, is another example of propaganda through aid. The huge Russian hospital now going up in Pnomh Penh is a third.

In using economic aid as a form of psychological warfare, Communist China, especially, begins with the enormous advantage of having been only recently an underdeveloped country itself. China is the classic example of the local boy making good, and the degree of success, as always, tends to outweigh the opprobrium associated with the methods by which it was achieved. All of Asia is in a hurry and if China can demonstrably make its great leap forward by denigrating the individual and turning the whole country into a vast military camp, then industrial progress may be considered cheap at the price, especially among people to whom poverty always denied liberty in the past. We are confronted, therefore, with subversion by example, and it is here that the real challenge exists in Southeast Asia.

Those aspects of the US Far Eastern policy more readily apparent to the Asian editorial writer appear to have failed. Two of America's closest allies, Pakistan and Thailand, have abandoned even lip-service to democratic forms of government; SEATO has never looked less impressive; and Communist China's progress and influence have expanded notably in the face of US disfavor and non-recognition.

Conceding the seriousness of the Southeast Asian situation during the period of the SEATO's organization in 1954, it is still difficult to escape the conclusion that SEATO was a case of shutting the stable door after the horse had bolted. The real danger of a war involving both Communist China and the US during the battle for Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam had receded, and Chou En-lai had already begun to propagate the gospel of peaceful co-existence. The dangers that had existed then were no longer those of overt aggression but of infiltration and subversion, and though SEATO adjusted itself to cope with this situation its effectiveness was trimmed by the narrow scope of its membership. Today the treaty is only as strong as its weakest links. Thailand after Marshal Sarit's latest *coup* within a *coup* will continue to favor general pro-Western policies, but the most intensive American efforts have not made a real fighting force of its Army, and the chameleon qualities of the Thai leaders are largely unchanged.

With elections likely to be postponed indefinitely in Pakistan and General Ayub Khan at war with the politicians whom he blames, no doubt accurately enough, for many of his country's internal ills, it is difficult to predict where Pakistan is heading. A continuing danger is that the Army, lacking restraining influences, may one day make good its constantly repeated threats to attack India. General Ayub Khan actively encouraged such talk in his first days in office. And though his tone has been more moderate lately, the Pakistani press is still talking in terms of a *jehad*, or holy war. If this is mostly a nationalist rallying call to people whose homogeneity springs only from the Moslem religion, its repercussions in India are nonetheless serious. The undue emphasis each country places on military strength causes a huge diversion of funds from more essential agricultural and industrial projects. A week never passes that the Indian press does not carry an article on Pakistan's military bases and military preparations, all of which in the eyes of

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New Delhi have only one aim. In this ready-made situation, the Communists, professing admiration for India's neutral international role, find little difficulty in exploiting some of New Delhi's legitimate, if partly self-caused, fears among the ignorant and illiterate Indian masses.

In any case, the absence of India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia from SEATO denied it the identity of purpose which could have made it a significant force in Southeast Asian affairs. As it is, "umbrella of protection" over the former Indo-China states has neither prevented the dangerous subversion of Laos by the Neo Lao Hax Xat Party, nor persuaded Prince Norodom Sihanouk of the dangers of flirting with Peking. And in South Vietnam the credit for today's stability is not due to SEATO's influence but to US aid and the obduracy and patience of Premier Diem, who, in his initial struggle to survive, had to fight off British and French efforts to remove him from office on the one hand and the dissident sects that menaced effective government on the other.

Malaya, the one other center of strength in Southeast Asia, welcomes the presence of the British Commonwealth Southeast Asian Strategic Reserve, made up of British, Australian and New Zealand land, sea and air forces and the assistance it is providing in eliminating the last thousand Communist guerrillas from the jungle: but it has not joined SEATO, nor is it likely to even if, as expected, conservative Tengku Abdul Rahman and his Malay, Chinese and Indian Alliance Party sweeps into power again at the next election.

While SEATO cannot be abandoned without raising problems even more serious than are created by its continued existence, the current situation in Southeast Asia suggests numerous changes in emphasis, and even in policy, on the part of the United States. The relative importance of military aid *vis-à-vis* economic aid needs close examination. One problem in striking the balance between military and economic aid is that none of the principal recipients ever feels that it is getting enough of either. But in the light of experience since the Communists switched to peaceful co-existence, trade and aid, it would seem that a disproportionate share of American aid *has* been military, and that too much economic aid has been designed to shore up military positions. From the private and public statements of some allied Asian officials, it is also difficult to escape the conclusion that too often the *sine qua non* of their allegiance has been the hand-outs they expect in return. Virtue does not necessarily rest with the neutrals who are suspicious of American aid "because of strings" and conveniently disregard Communist intent when they accept aid from Moscow and Peking. Nor is India's holier-than-thou foreign policy easy to stomach, especially when it is interpreted by Krishna Menon. Still the fact remains that a combination of the Hindu mystique and solid British administrative training have given India the strongest-rooted concept of parliamentary democracy in Asia. It may not survive, but the chances of its survival will be immeasurably enhanced if the vast and continuing gap in financing the Second Five Year Plan and subsequent plans are bridged by the Western world. India's recent appeals for help have met with favorable, if qualified, response in recent months, but it is a point worth noting that in 1956 India received in foreign aid approximately one cent for each of its nearly 400 million inhabitants, while Laos, with roughly 2 million inhabitants, got more than $35 a head: no one who knows this backward little kingdom would deny its needs, but it is a matter of record that the aid it has received (Ba Maw's bread before ideas) has not been well spent.

Neither geographically, nor ethnologically, is India part of Southeast Asia proper and, in its current state of development, its direct influence is inevitably less than either the Indians themselves, or those who believed in Indian and Chinese spheres of influence, might have hoped. Yet without doubt, India and Japan are the two main pillars on which Southeast Asia's security rests. Their durability must be a first concern, for not only would the collapse of either or both lead to an immediate extension of Communist influence in the whole area, but they are the only significant exemplar nations to set off against the spectacular totalitarian successes of China. While India's immediate problem is the Second Five Year Plan and how to pay for it, Japan is challenged as never before by Communist China's bid to seize the Southeast Asian markets in the clear hope, as "Croesus" described it in New Delhi's *Eastern Economist*, that "the flag will follow the trade." Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi's concept of a modern co-prosperity sphere received little encouragement either in Washington, which was expected to supply the capital, or in Southeast Asia, which was expected to provide the raw materials and consume the finished goods. Renewed fears of China's trade practices and objectives have revived interest in the project in such countries as Malaya, however, and Tengku Abdul Rahman is currently giving every encouragement to Japanese business and arousing bitter Peking hostility by limiting imports of Chinese textiles.

WITHIN Southeast Asia itself, there is an urgently felt need for greater stability in commodity prices as a prerequisite to economic and political stability. An experts' report on the general problems in underdeveloped areas to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade expressed some skepticism about the value of commodity agreements, but the Southeast Asian countries, which have experienced the catastrophic effects of the precipitous rise and fall in the prices of rubber and tin, have different ideas. They feel that their views on the matter have not met with sufficient sympathy in London and Washington and they would welcome something in the nature of a regional economic alliance.

On the vexed question of the recognition of Commu-

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nist China, time and Peking's growing strength have removed one principal objection so far as Southeast Asia is concerned: the retrograde effect recognition was once thought likely to have on the numerically small, but economically vital, overseas Chinese. Among the Southeast Asian states that have not recognized Peking (Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Malaya and the Philippines) few believe that recognition would cause the Communists to change their ways. Some believe that though Peking would welcome Southeast Asia recognition, its intransigent stand on Formosa prohibits any hope of establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and China. But there is also the widespread, though far from unanimous, view that the Communists should be recognized as the sovereign power on the mainland and that the Nationalists should be presumed to be the *de jure* authority on Formosa until such time as the Formosans elect otherwise.

Such a proposal would, of course, be angrily denounced by the Nationalists and has already been contemptuously rejected in advance by the Communists. For years, however, the Communists themselves have been exploiting the value of the fair-sounding proposition, even though they know in advance it will be rejected. Since it is of importance for the West not only to be right but to give the appearance of being right, such a move by appealing to the Afro-Asian regard for self-determination, could conceivably help the United States regain the political initiative in the Far East and to destroy one of the main weapons in the Communists' propaganda arsenal.

On both counts, the need is urgent enough. For inevitably this New Year will bring new challenges. Singapore, a Chinese island city in the heart of Southeast Asia will become a self-governing state before summer: at best, its government may be the non-Communist wing of the Communist-backed People's Action Party. Laos faces elections that will be won on the current form by Prince Souphanouvong's Communist front, the Neo Lao Hax Xat Party. In Indonesia, the rebels are not yet fully over-thrown, nor is the economic and political drift halted; and while Jakarta's relations with Washington have improved notably in recent months, West New Guinea and the stand taken by Holland and Australia on the issue remains to excite easily aroused Indonesian emotions. Cambodia, with fresh aid from Peking, plans to push on with its Five Year Plan, but its relations with neighboring Thailand and Vietnam do not encourage hopes of stability. In Burma, Ne Win himself expressed doubts about what he will achieve in the six months which he has given himself to prepare the country for elections.

Fortunately things are rarely quite as hopeless as they seem in Southeast Asia: the problems and difficulties are not at all on one side. Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam has been conspicuously unsuccessful, for instance, and other Communist leaders, notably Thakin Than Tun in Burma and Chin Peng in Malay, have repeatedly blundered. The chances are, then, that the year will see nothing worse than continued but fairly slow deterioration.

SELF-CRITICISM *(or Ultima Ratio)*

WHY DOES Communism spread.
Why are millions turning Red
While Democracy's retreating in confusion?
In spite of huge exertions
The West makes no conversions,
And dares no longer nurse a fond delusion.

Democracy's appeal
Lacks missionary zeal,
Fanatic fervor, fury apoplectic,
Nor can its tests empirical
Approach the Marxist miracle—
The delightfully dynamic Dialectic.

For Communists have got
What Democracy has not,
A manifestly superhuman oracle,
And give to every query,
By fitting fact to theory,
The answers absolutely categorical.

But if they win because
Their Dialectic's laws
The uncommitted multitudes inveigle,
Through Marxist Revelation—
A misinterpretation
Of Kant and Proudhon, Feuerbach and Hegel,

Might not the West invent
A counter-argument,
Decisive in the propaganda tussle,
Extenuating NATO
By misunderstanding Plato,
Hobbes, Rousseau, Newton, Locke and Russell?

THOUGH psychologic war
Becomes a bigger bore
With double-dialectic terminology,
Let democratic twaddle
Improving on its model,
Spread Western idealistic ideology!

SAGITTARIUS

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The Superficial Aspect

Call in the Cookie-Pushers

THE AMERICAN with no inside information who must judge by the superficial aspect of things now has to choose one of two theories, both unpalatable. He must believe either (a) that the Administration really had no inkling that Lunik was going up and that Batista was coming down, or (b) that, possessing the information, it deemed it unimportant to give the American public the slightest warning of these impending events.

Since there is evidence to support either belief, it is admissible to confess a preference, and I prefer (a). If the government really didn't know what was happening, that is evidence merely of an incompetent spy system. But if it considered it inadvisable to inform the people of highly significant events simply because the information might be somewhat alarming, that is evidence of incompetent government; and it is obviously easier to reform the spy system than to reform the government from top to bottom.

The principal evidence supporting the more dismal theory (b) is, in fact, merely the prevalence of the Madison Avenue mentality in government circles. That mentality holds as an article of faith that what the customer does not know will not hurt the advertiser. This principle seems to be the only logical basis for Mr. Dulles' persistent refusal to permit American newspaper men to find out at their own risk what Red China is actually like and is actually doing.

On the other hand, the swift resignation of the American ambassador to Cuba supports the other theory. It is clear enough that Washington is not filled with love and admiration of Mr. Smith; and it is easy to understand why if he let Washington get caught in an embarrassing position when the Batista government fell. The event occurred between two editions of the *Baltimore Sun*. The morning paper carried dispatches from Havana asserting that the revolt was practically crushed; the *Evening Sun*, of the same day, announced Batista's flight. Editorially, the paper has remained grimly silent on the subject, but it can hardly be pleased at having been made to look foolish No more can the Associated Press and other news services, when the merest hint from the State Department would have enabled them to cover themselves with a paragraph explaining that the earlier dispatches were only what the Batista government said.

The prompt disappearance of the ambassador suggests that remedial steps are being taken, but it is not proof that they are sufficient. If the gentleman is, as various commentators have been cruel enough to suggest, merely a fat cat who owed his appointment to heavy campaign contributions, still that doesn't account for the embassy staff, the lads that used to be derisively called the cookie-pushers. In the old days, if a revolution had been boiling under his feet, even a second-rate cookie-pusher would have discovered it and would have tipped off Washington long before the bullets began to smash the embassy windows.

One is bound to suspect that here is a delayed reaction to the disastrous pilgrimage of Cohn and Schine, those fantastic stooges of Senator McCarthy, who trailed through Europe half a dozen years ago, shattering the morale of the Foreign Service. It was discovered then that any cookie-pusher who reported to Washington an opinion, however well-founded, that displeased a Senator was liable to be kicked out of his job and blasted as a Communist sympathizer; so, not being imbeciles, they quit reporting such opinions. But important news quite commonly comes in first as a rumor without confirmation, and if the State Department isn't informed of those rumors it may be caught flat-footed.

In any event, whatever the reason, it is evident that the American public is not being given early and accurate information of what is going on beyond the boundaries of the country. As regards the Russian satellite program there is some excuse, for gathering accurate information about that is extremely difficult. But when we are completely misled about the course of a civil war raging in an island 90 miles from Key West, our system of information is definitely breaking down badly.

PERHAPS it is impossible for a man who served his time in newspaper work in the editorial, not the advertising, end to form a just appreciation of the Madison Avenue mentality; but I am persuaded that one of the chief failures of this Administration is due to its inability to grasp the enormous difference between selling soap and gathering early and accurate information. Both, to be sure, are phases of public relations, but their methods are widely dissimilar. Roosevelt and Truman understood this, and FDR was the great master of the art of making a hostile press serve his own ends. The cookie-pushers may have their comic aspect, but as a class they are more intelligent than a couple of young squirts picked up by some Senator; and to a man they know that in ordinary affairs half a dozen first-rate American newspaper correspondents can get them more information than a platoon of hired spies and can get it sooner.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

My Fair Gentleman

by Malcolm Muggeridge

THE dust jacket of Mr. F. J. Stopp's study of Evelyn Waugh shows his subject, dressed in check tweeds, a large, unlighted cigar in his hand, and leaning over a gate inscribed: "Entrée Interdite aux Promeneurs." This portrait is by Cecil Beaton, who specializes in photographic studies of the royal family. It conveys the whole irony and poignancy of Mr. Waugh's life out of which his writings have come—the notice in French on the gate of what is supposed to be an English country house, itself, along with Mr. Waugh's singular fancy dress, serving to draw attention to him when, according to Mr. Stopp's and his own account, one of his major objects in life is to avoid being intruded upon or noticed.

Evelyn Waugh, Portrait of an Artist, by Frederick J. Stopp (Little, Brown; $4).

My own acquaintance with Mr. Waugh is slight. The last time I saw him was at a wedding. I am no expert on wedding attire, but his seemed unusual. A tall black top hat, I thought funereal in character, provided an additional bizarre touch. He made considerable play with an old-fashioned Victorian ear-trumpet, though whether for use or ostentation I cannot say. Occasionally he seemed to head in my direction, almost to orbit round me, but no trace of recognition appeared on his large, rubicund countenance. I felt no particular desire to be recognized by him, but these strange gyrations struck me as odd. In any case, on the few occasions that I have been on speaking terms with Mr. Waugh, I have formed the impression that he does not like me.

Usually, such antagonisms are mutual. I cannot, however, say that I reciprocate Mr. Waugh's dislike. There is, to me, something oddly sympathetic about this professional eccentric. I admire the bizarre, though none-the-less often highly effective, protests he has made against the times in which we both live. I once saw him at Brighton, on this occasion attired in an enormous overcoat and grey bowler hat. He was making his way alone on to the pier. I was tempted to follow him and see whether it was the machines—"What the Butler Saw," or some other—which attracted him thither, or whether he just went to the end to stare for a while out to sea. Despite his bulk and peculiar accoutrements, he had, I thought, an air almost of sanctity. The fool who persists in his folly becomes wise, Blake wrote. In this sense at least, Mr. Waugh may be accounted wise. Most of us, in the pursuit of folly, at a certain point prudently draw back. Mr. Waugh has persisted to the end. He has fought the good fight, if only with bladders and in the setting of a harliquinade.

Mr. Stopp's study is painstaking, sympathetic and occasionally illuminating. He suffers, however, under the disability that he has only felt able to offer serious criticism in the words of others. His own attitude is too uniformly approving to be interesting. Also, alas, he notably lacks Mr. Waugh's gift for the terse ironical phrase, the sharp, icy comment. He is deeply serious, if not solemn, and has that curious convoluted way of writing which life at a university (in his case, Cambridge) seems so often to inculcate. Mr. Waugh has long passed the time when he needs an apologist. He has, in any case, been most ardently his own. And, in his last work, *The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold*, a discerning reader may find out a great deal more about him than most authors have disclosed about themselves. Mr. Stopp could scarcely have hoped to add to this.

His *Evelyn Waugh* is divided into two parts, the first biographical, the second an analysis of Mr. Waugh's works. The biographical section takes us rather sketchily from Mr. Waugh's childhood in a prosperous London suburb, Golder's Green, the son of Arthur Waugh, for many years head of the publishing firm of Chapman and Hall, to his time at Lancing, where he began to emerge as a "character," and distinguished himself at the school debating society. Mr. Stopp adds, rather naïvely, that the Headmaster's House, at which Mr. Waugh was, had special connections with Eton, and that this may account for Mr. Waugh's subsequent large acquaintanceship with Etonians. I can think of other explanations.

Mr. Waugh went on to Hertford College, Oxford, where he obtained a history scholarship, and there became an eminent figure among the group of aesthetes whose leader and chronicler was Harold Acton. A portrait by Henry Lamb belonging to this period bears out Harold Acton's description of him as

> a prancing faun, thinly disguised by conventional attire. His wide-apart eyes, always ready to be startled under raised eyebrows, the curved sensual lips, the hyacinthine locks of hair, I had seen in marble and bronze at Naples, in the Vatican Museum, and on fountainheads all over Italy.

He neglected to take his degree, though he obtained a third-class in his finals. After Oxford, he was at a loose-ends, did a bit of preparatory school teaching (resulting later in *Decline and Fall*), tried his hand at carpentry, and, after his first marriage, began to write. His marriage was a failure, and he spent most of the remaining years before the outbreak of the 1939-45 war in travelling and writing travel books.

WITH great gallantry and persistence, although by this time 37, he managed to become a combatant soldier, and was with the Royal Marine Commandos in North Africa. Then he transferred to the Blues (the Royal Horse Guards), and, by one of life's little ironies, was given indefinite leave of absence to write a book—*Brideshead Revisited*. From this compulsory retirement, he was rescued by Mr. Randolph Churchill, with whom he joined Fitzroy Maclean's Military Mission in Yugoslavia. It was during this period that he first elaborated his interesting theory that Marshal Tito is, in fact, a woman. I caught a glimpse of him in the war, in Algiers, at a picnic party given by the Duff Coopers. He seemed, I thought, somewhat bemused and melancholy. His uniform, though exact, somehow gave the impression of

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not quite belonging to him. He looked, I decided, like a letter delivered to the wrong address.

IN 1930, he had been received into the Roman Catholic Church, and after the war married into a delightful family of that faith, the Herberts. Thenceforth, he settled down to elaborate his impersonation of a crusty old country gentleman, collecting the requisite properties, both personal and household, and occasionally appearing in London in this rôle. Mr. J. B. Priestley and others have complained about the impersonation on the ground that the writer has been suffocated by the elaborate superstructure it has required. This seems to me absurd for two reasons—firstly, that Mr. Waugh remains an excellent writer, probably the most accomplished today in the English language, and, secondly, that his impersonation of a country gentleman is as integral a part of his writing as was George Orwell's equally absurd converse impersonation of a down-and-out.

An interesting comparison could be made between these two. Whereas Mr. Waugh considers it "common" to pile plates after a meal, Orwell thought it "unproletarian" to drink in a saloon bar; whereas Mr. Waugh's wardrobe is based on sporting prints of the late 19th Century, Orwell's followed the general lines of a workman in *Punch* jokes of the same period. If Orwell had not been able to convince himself that he was once down and out in Paris, and to dress and play the part, however imperfectly, the probability is that he would never have written *Animal Farm* or *1984*. In the same way, Mr. Waugh's masquerade has been essential to his work. Without it we might well have lacked his delightful comedies, in the Wodehouse manner (though Wodehouse with a decided dash of vinegar), that little masterpiece, *The Loved One*, as well as *Brideshead Revisited*, his books on the war, and, finally, Pinfold.

Precisely the same comment may be made on Mr. Waugh's occasional political attitudes, which some have found offensive. Peppery old gentlemen living in the country, and needing ear-trumpets to hear what is said to them, are naturally pretty antidiluvian in their ideas. *The Times* is too Red for them, modern Toryism is little better than Bolshevism, and if they have occasionally heard the radio playing in the servants' hall, television is something they just do not know about. So it must be with Mr. Waugh, though, according to Mr. Stopp, acute boredom often induces him to go off to the local cinema in the afternoon. Again, it is an infinitely touching picture—the grey bowler perched on the large head, the defiantly "loud" country suit, the pony-trap harnessed and whip cracked. But to go where? To the local Odeon to see Gary Cooper. "World, World; Oh! World," as Lear remarked in not wholly dissimilar circumstances.

Mr. Waugh would, in any case, accept what he supposed to be the political attitudes which went with his Roman Catholicism. For instance, he would feel bound to approve of Franco quite irrespective of any private distaste he might have for the Franco régime. He has labored hard to make himself into a conformist, though his conformism is a Do It Yourself brand of his own. Thus, as a war-time soldier, his object was to submerge himself in smart regimental life. The novelist and gentleman must give way to the officer and gentleman. This, of course, did not make for popularity in the mess. His fellow-officers wanted to be diverted by the author of *Vile Bodies*, not confronted with a slightly grotesque, aging version of themselves. They expected him to be funny and unusual, not taciturn and sullenly laboring to be usual. As is clear from his two novels, *Men at Arms* and *Officers and Gentlemen*, the Pinfold voices told Mr. Waugh this at the time—which must have made his suffering all the greater. He bore it, as always, with fortitude.

Mr. Stopp is puzzled by the great popularity of Mr. Waugh's novels—especially, of *Brideshead Revisited*—in the United States. This is the only book by Mr. Waugh I have never been able to get through. It seems to me to be tedious and rather foolish. On the other hand, I find no difficulty in understanding why its American edition should have sold 700,000 copies. Its success, surely, is exactly comparable with that of *My Fair Lady*. Indeed, it might well have been called *My Fair Gentleman*. It sustains the illusion, especially dear nowadays to many Americans, that the old familiar social landmarks are still extant in England. How amusing that yesterday's *Chicago Tribune* target should be today's solace! It is the kind of situation with which Mr. Waugh in his young days would have been particularly fitted to deal. Indeed, up to a point (Lord Copper) he does deal with it in the first part of *The Loved One*. That he should have benefited from it financially, is, therefore, right and proper.

THE SIDE of Waugh which is most admirable, as Mr. Stopp clearly shows, is his unpretentious dedication to the craft of letters. He has refused to be side-tracked into all those ancillary activities upon which the rest of us have, uselessly and often shamefully, expended so much spirit. He decided to be a writer instead of a carpenter, and thenceforth devoted himself wholeheartedly and conscientiously to this pursuit. How few in our time have managed to do this! Even the terrible Pinfold experience (equivalent, in the context of his life, to Scott Fitzgerald's Crack-up) was coolly, neatly, expertly recorded. So rare a devotion deserves at least the Order of Merit. I should love to see it round his neck even though he still looked at me across it with those angry, explosive eyes of his.

To a Friend

COME, don't I know that, stumbling in the dark,
Our night will never change to light anew?
Am I a beast—is not the good of millions
Dearer than the petty welfare of the few?

And don't I make the Five-Year Plan my plan
And goal—sink with its fall, thrive with its rise?
Then why disown my private feelings, deny
Our great inertia, and our doubts and fears despise?

In vain in our days of the Supreme Soviet,
Where powers occupy their rightful place,
They reserve the poet's chair in assembly halls:
It's dangerous if occupied in any case.

BORIS PASTERNAK
Translated from the Russian by Eugene M. Kayden

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A Post-Mortem on the CP

by Philip Green

IRVING HOWE'S and Lewis Coser's critical history of the American Communist Party is a brilliant book, entertaining, lucid, and composed with real style. Though marred by occasional defects of historical method it remains the most penetrating analysis of the subject matter that I have seen. On the surface, the authors' chronicle is simply the story of the CP's rise and fall, from its sources in early American radicalism to its recent (putative) demise, under the pressures —both external and self-imposed—of the past decade.

The American Communist Party: A Critical History, by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser (Beacon; $6.75).

They are not, however, concerned merely with the chronology and explication of events. What they are after is to show how, under the impact of the October Revolution, a dominant segment of the American Left was led to betray its roots in genuine native radicalism; how their attachment to a foreign power, combined with the CP's gradual Stalinization, eventually proved disastrous both to the Party and to the American radical movement as a whole.

"In the long run," Howe and Coser write, "our story is a story of human waste." They have told that story with real skill and insight.

Unavoidably, however, such an interpretive description would not carry complete conviction to readers unacquainted with the *institutional* life and growth of the Party which is the center of the narrative. Therefore, a comprehensive institutional history becomes an essential part of the interpretation. This type of difficulty in historical writing can be easily met under ordinary circumstances: the interpretive historian usually incorporates by reference—if he lacks the resources to redo the work himself—as much as is needed of the basic research which has been previously accumulated and published in an organized form; only then can a critical analysis be fully convincing. But in this particular instance, the basic scholarship was still mostly undone when Howe and Coser originally set to work (they candidly acknowledge their regret that Theodore Draper's *The Roots Of American Communism* was published too late for them to make use of it). Reliance on the accredited scholarship of others was thus impossible for them; they had, in spite of themselves, to write their own institutional history of the CP.

Considering that this is exactly the subject that they intended to treat as being of secondary significance, it is not surprising that the force of this otherwise excellent work is thereby diminished. There are unfortunate gaps between the historical material and the critical conclusions which leave the reader uneasy and questioning. This difficulty, furthermore, is in large part due to limitations which are self-imposed, by a highly dubious methodological approach: "We have used public sources," they write, "and have not relied upon the personal testimony of Communists, ex-Communists, or anti-Communists."

It may be that there is somewhere a major work of historical research which is based almost entirely on newspaper clippings and documents available in public libraries; but I have not come across it. In any event, for this particular historical study such an approach is peculiarly inappropriate. For "public sources" not unexpectedly turn out to be largely the Party press (what, by the way, is Foster's autobiography if not the "personal testimony of a Communist"?), which at some times, and on some subjects, has been totally unreliable. The authors were, undoubtedly, aware of this problem, which must place serious obstacles in the way of accurate interpretation. And yet, they deliberately ignored the very best possible material which might have been available to them for purposes of cross-checking and verification: the numerous letters, records, memoirs, and other documents held by private persons throughout the United States, which contain, as Draper has shown, a mass of essential material.

This lack may very well leave *over-all* accuracy unimpaired, and that in fact is my own impression of the work. But in some specific instances, however, bad mistakes are almost inevitable. The authors' misinterpretation of the role of Louis Fraina (Lewis Corey) is a case in point. The gratuitous judgment they pass on his character (which would come as a shocking surprise to hundreds who knew him) can only be explained—given their heavily weighted bibliography—by the fact that they gleaned most of their material from a Party press which malignantly hated him; there is certainly something wrong with a methodology that can give such results.

But the most unhappy effect of this approach is that it is bound to create a marginal area of uncertainty in the lay reader, with the result that those who would like fully to accept Howe's and Coser's critical conclusions may hesitate to do so. This is especially true of their last chapter—"Toward a Theory of Stalinism"—which attempts to construct a theoretical framework from which to view the relationship of Communism to the objective social setting. Theoretically, their analysis is brilliant, but evidentially it is inconclusive. Stalinization, after all, is a process which primarily involves organizational and personal behavior—but this is the area in which their descriptive material is by choice most sketchy.

THUS, for example, their dismissal of some over-simplified psychological explanations of Communist behavior is entirely convincing. (One of the most valuable contributions they make, in fact, is that they give a real sense of how, at some moments in our history, it has been possible for rational persons to view American society with complete despair, so that at least the initial commitment to Communism can be seen as a comprehensible response to events, not merely a pathological aberration). But their own theory, based on the concept of "relative deprivation," is sometimes vague and hollow where it should be precise and solid, and their answer to the basic question—how explain the *behavior* of American Communists?—leaves the reader unsatisfied. Similarly, their attack on Sidney Hook's thesis that every Communist is *ipso facto* a conspirator is vitiated by their refusal to deal in any way with that portion of the Party's membership which undeniably was engaged in subversive conspiracies.

A little more conventional scholarship would have done much to fill in these gaps. But one cannot avoid the feeling, in truth, that the passions which motivated the production of this volume had

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little to do with the zeal of conventional scholarship. Why did these two men whose professional competence, after all, lies primarily outside the field of historical research, choose to write *this* book at *this* time, before at least some of the necessary material was available in the form of a workable historical foundation? The answer seems fairly obvious: at heart, they are at least as concerned with the fate of the non-Communist radical Left as with that of the CP.

There is evidence both within and external to the book itself to bear out this observation. Most striking, perhaps, is the authors' dedication "To Ignazio Silone and Milovan Djilas"—two men who more than any others stand for the attempt to create a non-Communist radical opinion in Europe today; in this connection one remembers the enthusiasm and hope with which Howe and Coser greeted the Hungarian Revolution as "The vindication of man in the Twentieth Century." Also suggestive—and somewhat disturbing as well—is their marked emphasis on *Stalinism* in what purports to be a study of the *Communist* Party, an emphasis which has the curious cumulative effect of implying that some happier alternative once existed and was destroyed, not by the October Revolution, but in 1923. (Is it not really a bit too simple to call Stalinism a "counter-revolution," as do Howe and Coser, suggesting by the term not a logical historical process but some kind of *putsch*? While Stalinism may not have been an inevitable result, it certainly was clearly implicit in Leninism: the dictatorship of the proletariat would seem to lead as logically to totalitarianism as anything else. I should think there would be better sources available for the continuing radical tradition than the blood-bath of the October Revolution).

IN BRIEF, what they seem to have intended was essentially a polemic, designed as a step in the process of rebuilding American radicalism by taking it back from under the shadow of the Communists who virtually destroyed it. Polemics and history do not weld easily, and by ordinary standards Howe and Coser have done the job quite well. But when the object of the polemic is as laudable as it is here, one can only wish that the history had been not just adequate, but unassailable.

ART

The Same Old Schmeerkunst

THE CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL is this year also part of the city of Pittsburgh's bicentennial celebration. Extra funds thus available made a sculpture section possible for the first time since it all began in 1896; and they made possible a retrospective of selected works from previous Internationals. The management, in the long introduction to the flash-back, invites us all to have a few hearty laughs at its predecessors. Before the laugh parade begins, Director Gordon Washburn notes that the history of the show "is an excellent reminder that imperfection is basic to our human condition. . . . Perhaps our only consolation, when a blindness of judgment seems to have been too outrageous, is that we behave today with more humility than did the Victorian and Edwardian generation of critics." Some further consolation is offered in Mr. Washburn's explanation of that outrageous Edwardian blindness: "To be out of step with your contemporaries is to be camouflaged. Although clearly visible, no one may chance to 'see' you."

Thank heaven we're beyond all that today!

The new humility is immediately evident in this year's International itself. The juries and Carnegie directors who selected shows in the past were mostly preoccupied with the application of standards of one kind or another. Mr. Washburn mentions the ideas of drawing and proportion as pretty misleading. In selecting his show, Mr. Washburn has applied no standards except that of having no standards. In total humility, he has gone to the mode for guidance and the mode has made the Carnegie International a Godey's Lady's Book of free style painting. No nonsense about drawing or proportion here. Only an enthusiastic plunge into the current fashion; and only an Edwardian would suggest that that's what the Edwardians were doing.

Like any good fashion reporter, I made some notes on new directions among the couturiers. No overall trend seems to exist except trend itself and that's basic. Marca-Relli, who established his identity by cutting up white canvas and pasting the pieces back together with runny black paint, has added color, making up in variety what he's lost in monotony. Franz Kline has moved from great black slashes in great white space to (relatively) small white space peeping through an increased amount of black slash. Grace Hartigan, who once abstracted the colors of eggplants and artichokes and even tomatoes, is citrous now. "Orange Painting" is seven feet of it. Barnett Newman has changed direction drastically: it seems only yesterday (come to think of it, it *was* only yesterday) that Newman was exhibiting the broad side of a barn painted in one flat color broken by occasional vertical stripes in other colors. Now the canvas itself is vertical, in blue-purple, and the stripes, top and bottom, are pale blue.

These, of course, are the great houses. The show makes its proper genuflections to them all but establishes its true level in the garment district, where platoons of cloak-and-suiters from all nations exhibit ready-to-wear in all variations. Robert Rauschenberg, who recently distinguished himself by hanging up his bed-clothes in a New York gallery, achieves the equivalent of a Seventh Avenue occasional dress for all occasions; "Painting with Red Letter S" has samples of paint dripped, paint smeared, paint stained, paint wiped and a stencilled S. Take your choice.

The show demonstrates what has long been evident, that in some circles the word "painting" itself is rapidly becoming either archaic or a figure of speech. The word continues to be used, mostly, I guess, because no one's come up with a more accurate one. Robert Motherwell's casual paste-up of old brown wrapping paper torn into pieces illustrates the need for a new name and so does "Grande Legno 2," Alberto Burri's winner of the third "painting" prize. It is made of wood strips clumsily knocked together in a six foot square and signifies wood strips clumsily knocked together in a six

Notes on Contributors

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foot square. For the difficult transition period between now and when either all painting is done without paint or all these people begin working for a living, I offer "miscellaneous" or, perhaps more mythic, ambivalent and Zennish, "other" as the needed new category.

Along these general lines I was recently entranced by a clarion call from Allan Kaprow, who was born, appropriately enough, in Atlantic City and who fights the good fight at dear old Rutgers. Writing in *Art News*—where else?—Kaprow demanded an end to this silly categorizing of people as "painters," "poets" and "dancers" and hailed the coming of "bold creators" who will be simply "artists" and who will fashion a new art out of the "odor of crushed strawberries, a letter from a friend, a billboard selling Draino . . . a scratch, a sigh . . . a bowler hat." With considerable humility and musing on the number of bowlers to be found in New Brunswick, N. J., I hurried through the gaudy halls at Pittsburgh (no bowlers in view) in search of Kaprow's strawberries. Not a strawberry! Not a scratch or a sigh, not even a postcard from a slight acquaintance, and no bowler. Only about eight by six feet of the same old *schmeerkunst,* mostly in yellow and red with, very likely as a hint of strawberries yet to come, some jagged strips of what seemed to be aluminum foil pasted onto the thick paint.

All this sounds pretty dreadful and it is. Yet, tucked away in corners at Pittsburgh is a lot of good painting, most of it European or American with an obvious awareness of European tradition. The European cloak-and-suiters are following American patterns and botching them up —not an easy thing to do, when you think of it. But in the truly European painters, orders, elegance and strength, in varying proportions, survive in paintings with no reference to the visible world, in works by Soulages, Hartung, Bazaine, Vieira da Silva, Manessier, Music and others. The visible world itself is well represented in painters like Picasso, Kokoschka, Rattner, Chagall, Morandi.

What the Carnegie proves more than anything is that we don't learn from the past. The frightful jingoist overrating of the American Scene 20 years ago on purely nationalist grounds is being repeated today with abstract expressionism on the same grounds and the results are even more dismal. FRANK GETLEIN

MOVIES

The War Goes On

THE FLOOD of World War II films continues, fictional and factual, with most of the latter coming from abroad. Three of the more interesting recent factual items are here considered, all derived from successful books. (The popularity of war books is undiminished; *The Bookseller,* Britain's leading journal of the trade, now has a separate section for them in its seasonal forecasts.)

Nine Lives, from the book *We Die Alone,* is the story of Jan Baalsrud, a Norwegian "freedom fighter" stranded on the west coast of Norway in the winter of 1943 and tells how he made his way across the top of Norway to Sweden and escape. Snow-covered mountain ranges, thousands of feet high, a wounded foot, and the constant threat of the Germans were some of the obstacles. The deadly risk for those who helped him and the threat of gangrene were two other complications.

Nine Lives (de Rochemont); *I Was Monty's Double* (NTA); *The Silent Enemy* (Universal-International).

The picture was filmed along the exact route that Baalsrud took, with a cast of good Norwegian actors. Arne Skouen has directed with a large eye for staggering, far, white reaches and with a close, warm sense of humanity in the scenes with the fisherfolk and farmers along the way. There is a particularly striking scene in which the snow-blind Baalsrud makes his way down a mountainside on skis, tossing snowballs ahead of him every few yards to detect by the sound whether he's on the edge of a crevasse; and there is a particularly gruesome scene in which, waiting in a hut that his helpers cannot reach because of a storm, he amputates his own toe.

But the climax of the story is the sequence in which the sick, weak Baalsrud is dragged on a sled up a pass 3,000 feet high and is stored under a rock on the summit, to be taken further by men who are to come up from a village on the other side. Crossed signals and lurking German ski troops interfere; and Baalsrud spends fifteen days motionless under that rock on top of a wintry world. He is visited once by one of the farmers who brought him there and the farmer's wife, who think Baalsrud must be dead if he has not been picked up and who have made the trip again simply to take out the corpse. They shovel away the drifts; and he is still alive and waiting. They give him food and brandy and leave him, perforce, to wait longer.

These fifteen solitary days were the best thing in the book and could not be as effective in a film since their main interest lay in their interior drama. Still the sequence is moving—an example of what Keats called "negative capability," the power to endure "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason."

WAR not only has a thread of the savagely comic running through it, it also has episodes in which, dangerous though they may be, the comic predominates. *I Was Monty's Double* is the story of an obscure actor named M. E. Clifton James who in wartime had become an equally obscure lieutenant in the Pay Corps. He happened to have an amazing physical and vocal resemblance to General Montgomery, and impersonated him in an Army show. And it happened that there was an Intelligence Officer present who was trying to think up some ruse to divert German troops on D-Day.

Before long the overwhelmed Clifton James was put through a rigorous course of training, was nerved to the event, and was sent, as Montgomery, on an inspection tour of North African forces just before the cross-Channel invasion. The news of his trip was leaked to spies so that the Germans would suspect that the invasion might possibly come from the south. They were, in fact, sufficiently impressed to hold several divisions there.

The film has a full quota of squeaks, narrow and funny, all nicely handled by

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director John Guillermin; the script, from Clifton James' book, is by Bryan Forbes who also plays in the film. John Mills and Cecil Parker are customarily brisk and capable as the Intelligence Officers in charge, and Clifton James plays himself, Montgomery, and, of course, himself as Montgomery. He seems quite happy about it all, but I couldn't escape a small embarrassment for his sake. Imagine being an actor all your life and then being given your only leading role—before or since—just because you happen to resemble a famous man.

The Silent Enemy deals with the Mediterranean activities of the frogmen and is unusual in two respects: the enemy is Italian (in 1941), and it is a British war film without John Mills. This is an account of the earlier exploits of Commander Crabb who was drowned in Portsmouth Harbor a few years ago while a Soviet warship was there; the mysterious circumstances of his death created considerable stir. This film, however, is about happier days when war was war, good and straightforward, and blows were dealt and taken.

The scene is Gibraltar where Allied shipping is being harassed by Italian skin-divers or frogmen, using two-man submarines and operating out of neutral Spain four miles away. The picture tells (with a few Rover Boy touches) how Crabb and his men saved the North African invasion fleet. Laurence Harvey plays—or, rather, swims—the role of Crabb, and the passable direction is by William Fairchild. There is some fine underwater photography by Otto Heller, including a hand-to-hand knife fight that is like a grotesque, slow-motion ballet.

These three films remind us again of two matters. First, the days when war was a kind of sports event with grave stakes are gone forever. (How can you use frogmen now that there is radar, and who needs commandos when there are tactical nuclear missiles?) Then, as you watch these various men and their heroic efforts, you cannot entirely suppress the out-dated thought: if only this immense courage and stamina could be devoted to something creative. Naïve and old-fashioned, no doubt; still one's eyes keep straying along the shelf towards James' *Moral Equivalent of War.*

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

able from other varieties of intellectual or emotional activity. I hope he will pardon me if I appear as naïve to him as he does to me, when I state that I have lived so far a satisfactory intellectual, emotional and physiological life of 70 years without having felt, in the last fifty of these, any need whatever for what religion has had to offer me. Having been brought up in a Protestant religious atmosphere, having been exposed in fact to considerable contact both with the biblical lore and with its more critical modern interpretations, I have come to certain, if possibly erroneous conclusions as to what people of my acquaintance actually get out of religion. I also know first hand what scientists of my acquaintance get out of science. I think they both finally attain to certain satisfactory ways of dealing with phenomena both subjective and in nature surrounding them, which they otherwise are unable to comprehend. But I think they attain this satisfactory outcome by somewhat different routes and with somewhat different end results.

As far as I can see, the religious person gets from his religion certain satisfactory solutions of his perplexities, if not answers to his questions. I am sure the scientist does not. No scientist worth his salt gets an answer that doesn't raise further questions still harder to find an answer to. In fact the real objective of the scientist finally becomes, not the immediate answers, but the realization of problems still to be formulated and dealt with. The universe unfolds before him as an increasingly complex and mysterious and incomprehensible totality, with respect to which the limited answers he can obtain in a lifetime serve chiefly to give him a better view of the ultimate complex. I think this unfolding of the complexities somehow, for the scientist, serves the same ends, if only in terms of intellectual and emotional preoccupation, as does religion or religious experience for the theologically indoctrinated believer, and at any rate the satisfaction obtainable through one approach seems capable in many cases of obviating the need for satisfaction afforded by the other.

I would seriously question whether the average scientist is any more "innocent

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in the field of religion" than is a man innocent in the field of science, who characterized scientists as cases of "arrested development," "starving their souls . . . playing with ever new combinations of this or that glorified mechano-set," and more of similar twaddle. I speak as one who spends considerable time in a laboratory well equipped with just such sophisticated mechano-sets, which I assure him are used, not as playthings but as instruments, as extensions of the scientist's hands and senses. This critique of scientific activity comes, it appears to me, with poor grace from one posing as the advocate of religion and its churches so elaborately adorned with madonnas, crosses, phallic spires and other paraphernalia of the doll house, subsumed I infer under the phrase "symbolic and imaginative dimensions of our culture" . . .

GEORGE H. BISHOP
Professor of Neurophysiology
Washington University Medical School

. . . Mr. Wilder Answers

PROFESSOR BISHOP in his comment on my article moves the area of debate from campus policy to the perennial issue of science and religion. His testimony as to the satisfactions afforded by a lifetime of scientific activity is surely to be respected. I would not, however, set this way of dealing with the world over against the religious way if the latter is understood in the vital terms that I urged. The kind of religious faith widely offered and deserving of a better hearing and examination in a college or university is no more satisfied with "immediate answers" than is science, but wrestles with new data and challenges from all quarters. It is constantly indebted to various sciences just as it uses scientific method in dealing with its own traditions and experience. It does not make itself an "advocate" of the *status quo* of the churches and their inherited symbols, but is primarily concerned today with their testing, purification and renewal, and with the help especially of the sciences of man.

My digs at "certain faculty groups" (not all) and at the "less imaginative type" of academic agnostics were occasioned by their insulation, constitutional or professional, from the live issues of religion and their handicaps, therefore, in dealing with the campus religious policy. But I do believe that our intellectuals generally are out of touch with what is going on in the critical reassessment of our religious traditions, and they are therefore excessively and unnecessarily negative towards giving them "full freedom in the open market of higher education."

AMOS N. WILDER
Basel, Switzerland

► *Mao's "Big Family"*

SIRS:

I SHARE many of Stanley Rich's doubts (in "Mao's 'Big Family'," *NR*, Jan. 5) about the Chinese regime, and I am certainly glad, being American, that I don't have to live under it. But when I read about " . . . transforming a fifth of the world's population into a faceless army answering only to the dictates of Peking," or "total destruction of the individual," it makes me wonder whether I am reading *The New Republic*, or the *American Mercury*.

There is nothing novel about the communal way of life. It is the oldest human way of life that we know of. Primitive society, with few exceptions, is and has always been communal. It is private property, and the values and institutions connected with it, that must if anything be considered new fangled and radical.

In the second place, we know enough of communal society to know that it can very often produce, not the destruction of individuality, but a rich variety of personality and character. Now it may be that the Chinese Communists intend to destroy the individual; but Mr. Rich does not quote anything to support such a contention.

In the third place, we ought to undertake with a good deal of humility any criticism of the Chinese attempts to modernize their country. Can we think of a better way to do it? Do we contend that parliamentary democracy plus private enterprise, leavened with a little New or Fair Dealing, will do the trick? Or do we say, since the Chinese cannot enrich themselves by our methods, that they must remain a nation of backward, half-starved peasants? If we are going to urge them to renounce material well being in favor of things of the spirit, we might do well first to try a little of this medicine ourselves.

JOHN C. HOLT II
Boston, Mass.

. . . "Grandfather Society"

SIRS:

STANLEY RICH'S ARTICLE on the communes in Communist China (*NR*, January 5) is to be commended for its proper balance. . . . One factual correction needs to be made, however. Mr. Rich translates the term "Kung She" into "Grandfather Society" and proceeds to use this translation half a dozen times. The word "kung" can, indeed, mean "grandfather," but it also means "common" or "public," among other things, and in the context of communes it decidedly does not mean "grandfather." A parallel approach to that taken by Mr. Rich would be to translate the Chinese term for "bus" as "grandfather automobile," or the Chinese term for "public safety" as "grandfather safety."

OLIVER LEE
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